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Abstract
In this paper, we consider an intergroup contest game with intragroup altruism. We show that more altruism within a
group increases conflict intensity by increasing total groups' efforts. Moreover, we show that, unlike the celebrated
Olson's group size paradox, group size increases the probability of winning the contest provided that intragroup
altruism is high enough.
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1. Introduction
Scholars in different disciplines have argued that intragroup cooperation plays a central role in sit-
uations of intergroup conflict.1 Military discourse for instance repeatedly appeals to group loyalty
and group identity, suggesting that intragroup cooperation is instrumental in wars. Moreover, it
has often been advanced that altruism is a key behavioral factor explaining intragroup cooperation
(Dawes et al. 1977). Extensive empirical as well as numerical research provides an evolutionary
basis for intragroup altruism in the context of intergroup conflict (Bowles 2006, Rusch 2014).
In this paper, we examine theoretically the role of intragroup altruism in an intergroup contest
game. As a first step, we consider a static game with exogenous intragroup altruism. We show
that an increase in altruism within a group confers an advantage to that group but also increases
conflict intensity. We also examine the impact of group size, and in turn revisit the celebrated
Olson (1965)’s “group size paradox” that smaller groups have an advantage in intergroup conflicts
(Esteban and Ray 2001, Cheikbossian 2012).
2. The Model
We consider a simple intergroup contest game in which two groups compete for a rent (Katz et
al. 1990, Nitzan 1991), except that we allow for intragroup altruism.2 For analytical simplicity,
we suppose that all members of the same group share the same degree of altruism. Denoting it by
α
A
∈ [0, 1] for group A and α
B
∈ [0, 1] for group B, the utility functions of agent i in groups A
and B are written respectively:
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where ai and bi indicate an individual agent’s effort in the respective groups. pA is the probability





, with A ≡
∑
i∈A ai and B ≡
∑
i∈B bi. wA and wB represent the value of
rent to an agent when her group wins the rent. Following Esteban and Ray (2001), we assume that
the rent is composed of both a pure public goods component P and an impure component R:
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wherem and n are the respective size (i.e. the number of members) of group A and B and λ ∈ [0, 1]
is the degree of publicness of the rent.
1See, e.g., in biology (Wilson and Wilson 2008), political science (Hardin 1995), psychology (Bornstein and Ben-
Yossef 1994) and economics (Abbink et al. 2010, Bowles and Gintis 2011).













so that (1) can be written:
ui = pAWA − ai − αA
∑
j∈A,j 6=i
aj, i ∈ A (2)
ui = (1− pA)WB − bi − αB
∑
j∈B,j 6=i





correspond to the “perceived rent” to an altruistic agent in either group.3 We
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We recognize here some common equilibrium features of contest games. A group with a larger
perceived rent collects more effort than its rival. As a consequence, this group also has a greater
probability to win the contest (Nitzan 1991). Moreover, the equilibrium effort of the group with
the higher perceived rent would increase if the other group exerts more effort, whereas the reverse
is true for the group with the lower perceived rent. The contest game is therefore neither a game
of strategic complements or a game of strategic substitutes (Dixit 1987): A group may “give up”
or “keep up” when the rival group increases its effort depending on whether the rival group exerts
relatively more or less effort.
3. The Effects of Intragroup Altruism and of Group Sizes
In this section, we first examine the effects of intragroup altruism and of group sizes across equi-
libria by comparing two equilibria that only differ by the degree of altruism or by the group size.
Then, we examine these effects within an equilibrium. That is, we compare the two groups’ re-
spective efforts at a specific equilibrium, and study how this comparison is affected by the groups’
differences in intragroup altruism and group size.
3Alger (2010) uses a similar terminology in a public goods game with altruistic agents.
3.1 Comparing equilibria









effect on the respective group’s perceived rent. Following (5), this implies that an increase of
altruism in a group has a positive effect on the group’s effort and its winning probability. Moreover,
although altruism may have either a positive or a negative effect on the rival group’s effort, its
impact on the total efforts of both groups is positive. In other words, intragroup altruism always
increases conflict intensity, namely the positive effect on own group’s effort dominates the negative
effect of the rival group’s effort, no matter the size difference between the two groups.4
We now study the impact of group size. Take group A for instance. Note thatW
A
varies with















This identifies two opposing effects of group size. First, there is a well known negative effect that
occurs in the standard intergroup contest game without altruism (i.e. α
A
= 0). That is, without
altruism, the free riding problem within a group is so severe that the size of group is detrimental
rather than an advantage. Only when λ = 1 is this effect nil, and the group size does not affect
equilibrium efforts. This corresponds to the neutrality result of group sizes first identified in Katz
et al. (1990). Second, there is a positive effect of size due to intragroup altruism represented by
the second term on the right hand side of (6). This is because intragroup altruism reduces free
riding within the group. As a result of these two effects, when the degree of intragroup altruism




, the overall effect of an increase in group size increases
this group’s effort, and in turn the group’s winning probability as well as the conflict intensity.
Interestingly, note that the threshold value such that group size affects the group’s effort positively
is decreasing in group size. Hence, the larger a group the lower the level of altruism required to
overturn the Olson paradox. We summarize the above observations in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. An increase in altruism in a group increases the efforts in that group and also
increases conflict intensity. An increase in the size of a group increases efforts in that group and
increases conflict intensity if and only if the degree of altruism in this group is high enough.
3.2 Within equilibrium comparison
We now focus on the comparison of efforts between the two groups at an equilibrium. Given above
results, it is obvious that if the groups have the same size, the one with a higher degree of altruism
collects more effort and wins the contest with a higher probability. Assuming symmetry within
each group, this implies that any agent in such a group also exerts more effort than any agent in the
other group. Furthermore, an agent in the more altruistic group also has a higher expected material
payoff (i.e., her expected utility excluding the altruistic component) than any agent in the other
group.5
4This result is not obvious. In asymmetric (group) contests, conflict intensity usually declines relative to the
symmetric case (Nti 1999).















(m−1) > 1 ⇐⇒ αA > αB .









when m > n. Without intragroup altruism, a larger group is disadvantaged.









when m > n and the group size paradox fails. Indeed, under full intragroup altruism,
agents behave as “one for all”, so that size becomes an advantage.









m > n iff α >
(1−λ)R
(1−λ)R+λPmn
. That is, the larger group has an advantage provided that the degree of
altruism is high enough. Note that, this time, the threshold value for a positive size effect expressed
in the degree of intragroup altruism is decreasing in the size of either group. One may also want
to compare agents’ material payoffs between the two groups. This comparison critically depends
on the publicness of the rent. It can be shown that there exists a threshold value λ∗ ∈ (0, 1), such
that an agent in a larger group has a higher expected material payoff iff λ > λ∗.6 We have just
assumed that groups of different sizes have the same degree of intragroup altruism. The following
proposition provides a general result that essentially confirms previous observations.
Proposition 2. The larger group collects more effort than the smaller group as long as intragroup
altruism or the number of agents in the larger group is high enough.
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In this paper, we have shown that more altruism within a group increases conflict intensity in an
intergroup contest game. Moreover, we have shown that in contrast to the group size paradox
(Olson 1965) group size increases the probability of winning the contest provided that intragroup
altruism is high enough. Some extensions of our simple model may consider that the size of the
rent depends on altruism (Nitzan and Ueda 2009), that altruism may depend on the size of the
group or that other-regarding preferences take different forms (e.g., inequity aversion, spite). More
6The proof is available upon request.
fundamentally, it may be interesting to study the evolutionarily stable degree of altruism (Alger
2010).
References
Abbink, K., Brandts, J., Herrmann, B., Orzen, H. (2010) “Intergroup Conflict and Intra-group
Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game” American Economic Review 100, 420-47.
Alger, I. (2010) “Public Goods Games, Altruism, and Evolution” Journal of Public Economic
Theory 12, 789-813.
Bornstein, G., Ben-Yossef, M. (1994) “Cooperation in Intergroup and Single-group Social Dilem-
mas” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 30, 52-67.
Bowles, S. (2006) “Group Competition, Reproductive Leveling, and the Evolution of Human Al-
truism” Science 314, 1569-1572.
Bowles, S., Gintis, H. (2011) A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and its Evolution, Prince-
ton University Press.
Cheikbossian, G. (2012) “The Collective Action Problem: Within-Group Cooperation and
Between-Group Competition in a Repeated Rent-Seeking Game” Games and Economic Be-
havior 74, 68-82.
Dawes, R. M., McTavish, J., Shaklee, H. (1977) “Behavior, Communication, and Assumptions
about Other People’s Behavior in a Commons Dilemma Situation” Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 35, 1-11.
Dixit, A. (1987) “Strategic Behavior in Contest” American Economic Review 77, 891-98.
Esteban, J., Ray, D. (2001) “Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox” American Political
Science Review 95, 663-672.
Hardin, R. (1995) One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict, Princeton University Press.
Hu, W., Treich, N. (2014) “Cooperate and Conquer” mimeo, Toulouse School of Economics.
Katz, E., Nitzan, S., Rosenberg, J. (1990) “Rent Seeking for Pure Public Goods” Public Choice
65, 49-60.
Nitzan, S. (1991) “Collective Rent Dissipation” Economic Journal 101, 1522-34.
Nitzan, S., Ueda, K. (2009) “Collective Contests for Commons and Club Goods” Journal of Public
Economics 93, 48-55.
Nti, K.O. (1999), “Rent-seeking with Asymmetric Valuations” Public Choice 98, 415-30.
Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Harvard
University Press.
Rusch, H. (2014) “The Evolutionary Interplay of Intergroup Conflict and Altruism in Humans:
a Review of Parochial Altruism Theory and Prospects for its Extension” Proceedings of the
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 281, 20141539. (DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2014.1539)
Tullock, G. (1980) “Efficient Rent-seeking” in Towards a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society by
Buchanan, J., Tollison, R., Tullock. T., Eds., College Station: Texas A & M University Press,
97-112.
Wilson, D. S., Wilson, E. O. (2008) “Evolution for the Good of the Group” American Scientist 96,
380-89.
